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Abstract
Security is essential in mobile computing. And, therefore, various access con-
trol modules have been introduced. However, the complicated mobile runtime
environment may directly impact on the integrity of these security modules, or
even compels them to make wrong access control decisions. Therefore, for a
trusted Flask based security system, it needs to be isolated from the danger-
ous mobile execution environment at runtime. In this paper, we propose an
isolated Flask security architecture called iFlask to solve this problem for the
Flask-based mandatory access control (MAC) system. iFlask puts its security
server subsystem into the enclave provided by the ARM TrustZone so as to avert
the negative impacts of the malicious environment. In the meanwhile, iFlask’s
object manager subsystems which run in the mobile system kernel use a built-in
supplicant proxy to effectively lookup policy decisions made by the back-end
security server residing in the enclave, and to enforce these rules on the system
with trustworthy behaviors. Moreover, to protect iFlask’s components which
are not protected by the enclave, we not only provide an exception trap mecha-
nism that enables TrustZone to enlarge its protection scope to protect selected
memory regions from the malicious system, but also establish a secure com-
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munication channel to the the enclave as well. The prototype is implemented
on SELinux, which is the widely used Flask-based MAC system, and the base
of SEAndroid. The experimental results show that SELinux receives reliable
protection, because it resists all known vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2015-1815)
and remains unaffected by the attacks in the test set.The propose architecture
have very slight impact on the performance, it shows a performance degradation
ranges between 0.53% to 6.49% compared to the naked system.
Keywords: iFlask, TrustZone, isolation
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth in the mobile computing, mobile security has has be-
come increasingly severe. Because mobile devices are designed as open and pro-
grammable and they can provide a large number of information services, includ-
ing web browsing, instant messaging, financial transaction and so on. Therefore,5
access control has been employed by the mobile system as safeguard [1, 2, 3, 4].
However, the threats which can compromise the mobile system would breach
these security services, because they run on the same privilege level and memory
address space.
Isolation is a feasible option for elimination of this ripple effect. Currently,10
either separating the security module as a distinct system process with a smaller
attack surface (i.e., small Trusted Computing Base) [1] or using hypervisor-
assisted isolation mechanism [5] is used to solve this problem. However, the
former cannot provide enough protection if the kernel is compromised, while
the latter may cause significant performance overhead and additional security15
problems in practice.
To solve these problems, we redesign the Flask security architecture based on
ARM TrustZone technology [6], called iFlask . TrustZone-based devices can cre-
ate an enclave, which is also named ”secure world”, to isolate the sensitive data
from the normal world rich execution environment (REE). iFlask puts the secu-20
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rity server into the secure world trusted execution environment (TEE), which
can prevent adversaries from changing the policy decision behaviors. In iFlask ,
much of the communication between the object managers and the migrated se-
curity server is based on the cross-world calling from a built-in supplicant proxy,
which runs in the normal world as a front-end part of iFlask. The responsibility25
of the proxy is to receive requests from the object managers, then forward them
to the secure world and send back the results. Lowest level of cross-world calling
is built on ARM Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction. Whenever an SMC
instruction invokes, it will cause a switching to the monitor mode of the secure
world, which can verify whether the call is safe or not. Thus, iFlask provides30
the required capabilities to do effective monitoring and protection for the policy
decision process of its security server.
In the same time, the integrity of iFlask front-end components hosted by the
normal world is also under protection. iFlask builds an exception trap mech-
anism to prevent unauthorized modification to critical CPU registers, such as35
SCTLR, TTBRs, and TTBCR. Meanwhile, by instrumenting the mobile system
kernel, page tables cannot be directly modified by the kernel. Any modification
is hooked by the SMC instruction and sent to the secure world to verify the
legitimacy. Furthermore, iFlask prevents the physical memory double mapping
to avoid bypassing the memory protection mechanism and object reuse. Thus,40
the security of the front-end components in the normal world are guaranteed,
even though they are on the same privilege level and memory address space
as the mobile system. Additionally, the communication channel to the secure
world is secured by cryptography technology as well.
It is also notable that the performance overhead may particularly be of45
great concern in the mobile devices that are mostly restricted by severe resource
constraints. Although the TrustZone hardware-assisted isolation does not cause
significant system-wide performance degradation compared to other software-
based solutions, the processor still needs to perform context switches to the
secure world before accessing the isolated resources, so that frequently access to50
the secure world will inevitably impact on the overall performance. Hence, two
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measures are taken by iFlask for performance optimization. First, in the normal
world, iFlask uses an access vector cache (AVC) to minimize the performance
impact caused by the TrustZone-based isolation mechanism. The AVC allows
the proxy to cache access decisions made by the back-end isolated MAC service55
in the secure world in order to minimize the performance overhead, because
the MAC supplicant client does not usually need to perform additional lookups
outside of that cache. And Second, iFlask makes secure world computation
SoC-bound, indicating that the data, code, heap and stack have to be stored
only in the cache. We also make use of the hardware-assisted cache locking60
function to pin down portions of the cache, without significantly impacting on
the overall performance.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are:
• We design a feasible iFlask security architecture by using ARM TrustZone
technology. Compared to Flask, iFlask shows superior security.65
• Performance is also under consideration in iFlask, different optimization
methods are adopted respectively in the normal world and the secure
world.
• We implement the prototype based on SELinux, and test it thoroughly to
verify the effectiveness of iFlask.70
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the background knowledge. Section 3 presents iFlask design in detail. Section 4
describes our implementation based on SELinux. Section 5 discusses our ex-
perimental evaluation. Section 6 summarizes related work. Section 7 concludes
this paper.75
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Flask Security Architecture
Flask [7] is a security architecture that restricts the level of control that users
or subjects have over the objects that they create. Unlike in a discretionary
4
access control (DAC), where users have full access control over their own files,80
directories, etc., Flask adds additional security contexts to all file system objects.
Users and processes must have the appropriate access right to these categories
before they can interact with these objects. However, adversaries can provoke
unusual modifications to the Flask’s behavior by tampering its execution state
variables, such as some critical CPU registers and data. Moreover, due to the85
current monolithic kernel design, the Flask architecture is hard to guarantee
its security thoroughly. The malicious code, such as kernel-level rootkits, can
embed itself into the compromised kernel and stealthily inflicts damages with
full, and unrestricted control to the Flask resources, like policies. Therefore, we
propose iFlask to solve this problem in this paper.90
2.2. ARM TrustZone Security Extension
ARM TrustZone is a security extension which enables the ARM devices to
operate in both the normal and secure world in a time-sliced fashion. It intro-
duces the notion of privilege separation to build an enclave. Diverse extensions
are integrated across the system to isolate two worlds so as to ensure the con-95
fidentiality and integrity of the secure world. For example, the normal and
secure worlds have their own CPU modes, ARM TrustZone uses an NS-bit in
the secure configuration register (SCR) to control and indicate whether a CPU
is executing in the normal world or the secure world. This bit is also used by
TrustZone components to manage access to resources (i.e., memory and periph-100
erals) out of the CPUs. TrustZone memory adapter (TZMA) and TrustZone
Address Space Controller (TZASC) partition the memory address correspond-
ing to DRAM and SRAM into several memory regions, each of which is marked
as either non-secure or secure. Moreover, the secure world has a higher privilege
than the normal world so that it can freely access the resources in the normal105
world such as CPU registers, memory, and peripherals, but not vice versa. In
addition, the monitor mode is the highest privileged mode, it is added alongside
the existing privileged modes to coordinate and arbitrate between normal world
and secure world.
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Figure 1: iFlask is a TrustZone based cross-world architecture. Its security server is hosted by
the secure world, while its object managers are running in the normal world. The interaction
between two worlds is based on SMC instruction. Memory protection service (MPS) and
cryptography service are designed to protect iFlask’s components outside the secure world.
Additionally, the AVC module and the locking down L2 cache lines method are used to improve
the system performance.
3. DESIGN110
In this section, we describe the design of iFlask. First, we introduce the ar-
chitecture overview of iFlask. Second, we present memory protection mechanism
provided by iFlask. Third, we describe the secure communication mechanism
used by iFlask. These three parts make up iFlask so as to build a comprehensive
protection framework.115
3.1. iFlask Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of iFlask architecture. Compared to the
Baseline, the architecture components of iFlask are across worlds: a back-end
security server hosted in the secure world and the front-end object managers as
well as the proxy serving in the normal world.120
As we mentioned in Section 2.1, the core component of the Flask is the secu-
rity server, which provides policy decisions based on security policies. Therefore,
iFlask isolates the security server from the normal world in order to protect it
from potential dangerous from the complicated execution environment. In the
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simplest implementation, the back-end security server need to provide security125
policy decisions, to maintain the security policy logic and policy-independent
data (i.e., security context and security identifier map), and to manage the AVC
of the proxy. The back-end security server also provides functionality for load-
ing and changing policies, moreover, its computation is SoC-bounded. This can
prove advantageous because the security server can improve its response time130
by using cached results. Meanwhile, the security policy is stored in the secure
world for security as well. All the MAC system components hosted by the back-
end MAC service are isolated from the normal world so that adversaries are
unable to directly launch attacks against them.
The proxy is responsible to route access control requests to the back-end se-135
curity server, to cache policy decisions and to invoke object managers to enforce
security policy decisions in the normal world. The object managers are used to
enforce security policy decisions. The proxy provides three primary elements for
object managers. First, the architecture provides interfaces for retrieving pol-
icy decisions from the security server. Second, the architecture provides object140
managers abilities to register and to receive notifications of changes to the secu-
rity policy. Third, it provides an AVC module that allows object managers to
access the policy decisions cached in the AVC to reduced the performance over-
head. Since the proxy is not built in the secure world, iFlask provides memory
protection based on exception trap mechanism for the components running in145
the normal world to enhance the rich execution environment security. Addition-
ally, the communication channel to the secure world is also secured. Section 3.2
and Section 3.3 describe the design of these protection mechanisms in detail.
3.2. Memory Protection Outside the Secure World
The mobile system virtual address (VA) is divided into 3 distinct regions:150
user memory, the kernel code, and the kernel const map mem. The const map mem
describes the physical address (PA) which is constantly mapped to the kernel.
The kernel allocates memory from the const map mem region when it needs
to create new objects like page tables. The user space memory regions are
7
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Figure 2: Normal World Virtual Memory Layout and Mapping Principle.
mapped as Privileged eXecute Never (PXN). The kernel code memory regions155
are mapped as read-only. The kernel const map mem region is configured as
non-executable privileged memory. Meanwhile, the memory protection service
(MPS) records the state of every page of the physical memory. Whenever a new
VA to PA mapping is built, the MPS checks the new access permission given to
the physical page against the control data to verify that there is no violation to160
the memory protection strategy. The physical memory state is saved in an ar-
ray named the phy map, each entry of this array corresponds to a 4KB physical
page. The phy map determines physical pages of whom need to be protected.
The phy map marks physical pages which are used by kernel code or page tables
as protected. Any request to build a writable mapping to the protected physi-165
cal pages will be rejected by MPS. Likewise, mapping a physical page which is
already mapped writable to user space will be rejected by the same logic.
Furthermore, we deprive the kernel from its own capability to modify page
tables. We replace the operation writing to critical CPU registers, such as
SCTLR, TTBRs, and TTBCR with the SMC instruction. Then, modifications170
to protected page tables are obliged to request appropriate operations from the
secure world. This is achieved by modifying the access permission in the page ta-
ble entry so that the memory hosting the modified page tables become read-only
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region. Such a process begins when the mobile system performs initialization
and is mandatory during each modify operation to the protected page table. If a175
page table is read-only to the kernel, usually, write to a read-only page is ended
in a descriptor indicating a lack of permissions. When a page fault occurs, the
page fault handler in the kernel will then generally pass a segmentation fault to
the offending process, indicating that the update was invalid. The code of the
page fault handler is part of the kernel. Its job is to analyze the cause of the180
fault and to do something about it. Therefore, we can replace the conventional
page fault handler by SMC instruction so that it is able to make specific page
faults trap into the secure world. The key point here is that TZASC and other
bus peripherals can grant access for the secure world to read/write normal world
memory. In addition, important to note that intercepting page table modifica-185
tions does not need the kernel in a safe state even though the trap relies on the
kernel to send the request for page table modification from the secure world.
Since the read-only page tables are non-writable to the kernel, it is not possible
for a compromised kernel to skip this mechanism without TrustZone knowledge.
According to the logic described above, iFlask front-end components such190
as object managers and the proxy can be protected by the MPS by modifying
their const map mem mapping to be read-only.
3.3. Security Cross-World Communication
The Weakness of Communication Channel for TrustZone: When the normal
world requests resources from the secure world, a communication channel is195
required for messaging between the two worlds. The channel simply use a block
of world-shared memory area that is not secure as it is used by both normal
and secure world.
iFlask provides a cryptographic service built in the secure world to protect
the shared data. The key pair are generate in the secure world. The public200
key is sent to the proxy to encrypt and sign the shared data, and the private
key is only saved in the secure world for decryption and verification. Therefore,
adversaries cannot steal the private key, and the data in the shared memory
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can be sent to the secure world safely. Additionally, the remote attestation of
the proxy is checked by the secure world, whenever it builds the session to the205
back-end security server. As long as the verification is invalid, the secure world
will reject the further requests from it and reboot the device. Hence, we can
guarantee that adversaries cannot breach the secure world by exploiting the
insecure communication way.
3.4. Secure World Cache-Assisted Acceleration210
Cache is one of the primary units to improve system performance in modern
processor architecture. iFlask uses cache-assisted acceleration mechanism to
reduce the response latency of the secure world application. Due to the tiny
volume of the trusted execution environment in the secure world, it can be
loaded into L2 unified cache entirely in order to improve execution efficiency.215
However, different from the physical memory resource which is divided into two
distinct regions for two worlds respectively, the whole L2 unified cache is shared.
It means that the data belongs to the normal world can replace the the cached
data which belongs to the secure world.
In order to keep the cached secure world data will not be replaced by the220
normal world data, we should lock down L2 cache lines. Locking down cache
for special usage will inevitably have an impact on the system performance.
Hence, it is important to control the usage of locked cache lines. In iFlask,
secure monitor has the highest priority to be locked into the cache, because it
is responsible to handle the SMC exception and switch the context which is the225
first thing have to be done before entering the secure world. The other security
services such as security server, MPS, and cryptography service are the second
highest priority. The priority of security policy set is the lowest, but we can lock
down most common policies. To the parts which are not locked in the L2 unified
cache will be store in the SRAM, which is faster than the physical memory.230
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4. IMPLEMENTATION
4.1. SELinux and Kernel Instrumentation
SELinux uses the Linux security Module (LSM) in the Linux kernel to
achieve mandatory access control in the REE. The main components of SELinux
are the SELinuxFS, object managers, access vector cache, security server, and235
security policy. We move security server, security policy, and configuration files
to the secure world, and keep the SELinuxFS, object managers, and the access
vector cache staying in the normal world. We build a TEE to host the security
server and the security policy in order to make them work properly. The object
managers and the proxy are merged into the AVC module. The SELinuxFS is240
an extension module of the filesystem. Both the AVC and the SELinuxFS are
stored in the kernel code memory region, hence, we mark their memory regions
as protected so as to secure their integrity even though the REE is compromised.
The Inter-Process Communication (IPC) is the original way of communica-
tion between the SELinux components. By employing the iFlask architecture,245
the IPC is replaced by the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) which is responsi-
ble to cross-world communication. The proxy can invoke the back-end service.
In our prototype, the RPC is based on GlobalPlatform TEE Client API in the
REE and GlobalPlatform TEE Internal API in the TEE, which are the industry
standard.250
We directly modify the source code of the kernel to place hooks upon modi-
fying page tables and upon writing to critical CPU registers. The hooks execute
an SMC instruction to switch to the secure world. We use a command ID which
is placed in a general purpose register upon the SMC call to differentiate the
SMC instructions called by kernel hooks from those requesting the back-end se-255
curity server. Whenever the execution switches to the secure world, the security
monitor checks that register value to determine the call type. In addition to
kernel instrumentation, we use a binary analysis tool to ensure that all critical
CPU registers writes are replaced by hooks, which is a basic requirement for
memory protection as discussed in Section 3.2. Likewise, we can insert an SMC260
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Figure 3: The secure boot sequence of the prototype.
instruction in place of the page table exception handler to implement the hooks
so that page fault can execute an SMC instruction to switch the secure world.
4.2. Secure Booting
Before iFlask working properly, two booting phases are required on the de-
vice. The first phase stage is the secure world initialization. iFlask components265
in the secure world are loaded into the secure world as long as the TEE boots
up and remains in the secure world memory until the system powers off or
restarts. Figure 3 shows the secure boot sequence. Firstly, after power on, the
hardware platform loads the secure bootloader from the secure ROM to the
SDRM. Then, the secure bootloader initializes the Secure Monitor layer and270
secure world runtime layer in an orderly manner, and loads images of trusted
service from the secure non-volatile storage into the memory of the secure world.
Finally, the secure bootloader switches the primary CPU state from the secure
to the non-secure so as to finish the first phase. The second phase stage is
the normal world initialization. After the primary processor switching from the275
secure state to the non-secure state, it launches the non-secure bootloader to ini-
tialize the REE in the normal world. The last step of secure boot is initializing
the iFlask components in the normal world. The most important work of the
normal world part initialization is to interact with the back-end services, which
is already running in the secure world, for object labeling. Then the booting280
finished. Notice that the system will panic if any step fails. The booting in
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our implementation is trusted, it prevents malicious firmware from running on
the memory by authenticating all boot firmware images, as well as the normal
world bootloader.
5. EVALUATION285
In this section, we present the evaluation on our prototype. First, we use
a micro-benchmark to measure the execution time required for a full context
switching to and from the secure world. Second, we use a set of benchmark-
ing tools to evaluate the overhead caused by employing iFlask. Third, we use
some real world exploits to test the effectiveness of our design, and describe the290
security analysis about iFlask from multiple vectors. Performance evaluation
was performed on the Hikey board, which is built around the HiSilicon Kirin
620 SOC whose microarchitecture is the Cortex-A53 with a 64-bit ARMv8-A
instruction set.
5.1. Overhead of World Switching295
Our first experiment is a micro-benchmark to measure the execution time
required for a full context switching to and from the secure world. To enable
a more accurate analysis, we use cycle counters and ARM cycle count reg-
ister (CCNT) to ensure consistency across multiple CPUs in the analysis of
micro-benchmark cases. Instruction barriers were utilized before and after tak-300
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Figure 5: Mainstream benchmarking results.
ing timestamps to avoid out-of-order execution or pipelining from skewing our
measurements.
The SMC-In micro-benchmark is to measure costs of the switch from the
normal world to the secure world by directly issuing the SMC instruction. The
SMC-Out micro-benchmark is for the opposite direction. The experimental305
results show that the cost of SMC-In was 2123 cycles and the cost of SMC-Out
was 1459 cycles, indicating that the number of cycles of a full round trip of
switch was around 3500 cycles. Exactly what needs to be saved and restored for
each switch depends on the hardware design and the software mechanism used
for inter-world communications.310
Additionally, we measure the switching overhead without cache-assisted op-
timization. We put the secure monitor in three another two memory places in
our platform, including DRAM and SRAM. As shown in Figure 4, the overhead
caused by the secure monitor can be reduced by placing its code and data in
fast memory close to the processor.315
5.2. Performance Impact on Mainstream Benchmarking
Our second measurement is to use popular benchmarks to evaluate the per-
formance overhead of TEE-perf implementation. We measured the performance
with widely used mobile benchmark tools: AnTuTu, BaseMark and Geekbench.
In the meanwhile, we also utilized other synthetic workload benchmark tools:320
CF-bench, IOZone, GFXBench and LMbench.
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Table 1: APP Loading Time (in seconds)
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Firefox 1.58 1.26 1.77 1.38 0.19 0.12
Calculator 1.01 0.72 1.23 0.86 0.22 0.14
Calendar 0.98 0.64 1.09 0.75 0.11 0.11
Disk Utility 1.13 0.93 1.34 1.08 0.21 0.15
Search 1.03 0.47 1.24 0.58 0.21 0.11
Contacts 1.04 0.48 1.21 0.51 0.17 0.03
Gallery 1.12 0.72 1.36 0.83 0.24 0.11
Chess 1.11 0.88 1.29 1.01 0.18 0.13
Advanced Setting 0.99 0.81 1.21 0.89 0.22 0.08
Application Baseline iFlask Extra Cost
To investigate the performance impact on the system, we tested the two
cases: Baseline and iFlask on. Note that the performance of Baseline repre-
sents the performance of applications when SELinux is running in the REE,
while the performance of iFlask on represents the performance of applications325
when iFlask is employed by SELinux.
Figure 5 provides the experimental results. In the figure, 1 represents the
performance of the Baseline, and higher values indicate lower latency or higher
throughput. When the iFlask is employed, overall performance is degraded
slightly. As shown in the experimental results, iFlask shows a low overhead330
that ranges between 0.53% to 6.49%. The results are expected because these
benchmarks involves a comprehensive evaluation of the overall system perfor-
mance, which includes CPU, memory, and I/O. iFlask adds overhead to a small
portion of these operations.
5.3. Latency of Application Loading Time335
User application loading time is an important aspect of the performance of
mobile devices since it impacts user experience. Therefore, the second measure-
ment is to measure the impact of loading Linux user space applications.
To simulate the real feelings, the process of loading time measurement was
done by using a Canon EOS 5D Mark III to record a video for displaying the340
open process, and the exact time spent in loading an app to display on the
screen was extracted from the video by playing it back. Twice measurements
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were done by us for one application. The first measurement was for creating
a fresh process, including making the policy decision, loading the binary code
from the storage device to memory and displaying for the first time. The second345
measurement was made when the first measurement was finished and the target
application was closed.
The results of the measurement are listed in Table 1, the extra cost indicates
the overhead added by iFlask. It is observed that there exists an obvious dif-
ference between two measurements. The overhead in the first loading is higher350
than that of the second loading. For further investigation, we found that the
high overhead in the first measurement is because there is no corresponding
policy decisions cached in the AVC. While most of latency caused in the second
measurement is due to kernel just executes the application process and displays
it on the screen.355
5.4. Security Analysis
iFlask passed through rigorous testing and evaluation that validate the ef-
fectiveness of its protection. We tested iFlask using the real world exploits, in-
cluding CVE-2007-5495, CVE-2007-5496, CVE-2015-1815, and an attack called
”troubleshooter” published in Github. We also wrote our own attack code that360
writes to the physical memory using the /dev/mem interface. Exploiting this
vulnerability allows a user space process to trick the kernel into maliciously
modifying its own memory hosting iFlask front-end components. We use these
exploits to trick the kernel to write the protected memory region, page tables
and parts of its data. All of these attacks failed because the protected memory365
region is mapped read-only. We also failed to modify the page tables to change
the protected kernel memory’s read-only access permission.
iFlask is based on the ARM TrustZone technology, therefore all its security
properties are contingent on the security of TrustZone. Recent reports [8, 9]
showed that any user space application is able to execute shellcode in the se-370
cure world. These attacks require two basic conditions: (1) the normal world
TrustZone driver accepts malformed ioctl command will allow installed appli-
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cation the execute arbitrary code in the kernel. (2) the secure world runtime
layer has the mistake in input structure bound check may lead to an arbitrary
code execution vulnerability in the secure world. In iFlask, the secure world375
runtime layer does not provide the public interface for the applications running
in the normal world to load any executable code into the secure world. All ap-
plications running in the secure world are loaded by the secure bootloader and
launched by the secure world runtime layer. There is no application dynamic
loading feature in our TEE design. Therefore, we can guarantee that the basic380
conditions of attacks against TrustZone do not exist in our system.
Since the policy decisions are made in the secure world, the malicious code
in the normal world has no privileges to access or modify any resources of
the security server directly at runtime. The access policy set used in the se-
curity server are stored on the secure non-volatile storage. They are loaded385
into the secure world memory region by the secure bootloader when the system
starts up. Therefore, the adversaries is unable to access the secure world part
of iFlask from either the non-volatile storage or the secure memory except for
the hardware attacks. In addition, the adversaries may try to tamper with the
control flow of security server. But, due to the code of security server runs in the390
secure world, the attacks cannot modify its code. Moreover, since all the secure
interrupts are triggered in the secure world, the adversaries cannot intercept the
workflow of the secure world part through interrupts. Although a world-shared
memory region that can be modified by the mobile system, iFlask provides the
cryptography method to protect the security of communication channel between395
two worlds. Therefore, we can guarantee that the information to and from the
secure world is safe.
6. RELATED WORK
Hypervisor-assisted isolation methods are widely researched and applied.
They use virtualization technology to provide high privilege and isolation for400
protecting security services. Nevertheless, hypervisors have security challenges
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of their own. They are expected to do more tasks for system resource manage-
ment and distribution. Their source codes are too big to ensure safety. There-
fore, a number of vulnerabilities in hypervisors increase the risks of attacks on
isolated security services. It is difficult to ensure the absence of exploitable vul-405
nerabilities in hypervisors that could be utilized to disable security checks and
access sensitive data.
In mobile computing, ARM is the most widely used instruction set architec-
ture in terms of quantity produced, with over a hundred billion ARM processors
produced as of 2017. Therefore, There are many researches [10, 11, 12, 13, 14,410
15, 16, 17, 18] have managed to use TrustZone to protect their sensitive code and
data of applications in an isolated execution environment against a potentially
compromised mobile system. Most of them focus on building a thinner, more
secure environment dedicated to process sensitive data, such as cryptography
and authentication. In this paper, we provide an isolation mechanism to the415
MAC system by migrating it to the TrustZone secure world. In addition, we
present techniques that focus on data integrity outside the secure world and on
performance optimization to make iFlask a real world solution.
7. CONCLUSION
iFlask provides Flask system real-time protection based on ARM TrustZone420
technology. It migrates the security server to the secure world, and establish the
memory protection, cryptography and digital signature to protect the rest part
in the normal world. Compared to other feasible solutions, our design not only
diminishes the performance overhead caused by isolation, but also reduces the
Flask’s attack surface so as to make most of specific attacks invalid. In other425
words, iFlask does not have to trade off isolation and effectiveness.
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Highlights 
 
 We design a feasible iFlask security architecture by using ARM 
TrustZone technology. Compared to Flask, iFlask shows 
superior security. 
 Performance is also under consideration in iFlask, different 
optimization methods are adopted respectively in the normal 
world and the secure world. 
 We implement the prototype based on SELinux, and test it 
thoroughly to verify the effectiveness of iFlask. 
